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Abstract
The rate of homeownership among African-American households is consid-
erably lower than white households in American urban areas. This paper exam-
ines whether racial differneces in residential location outcomes are among the
factors that contribute to the large racial differences in homeownership rates in
major US metropolitan areas. Based on the 1985 metropolitan sample of the
American Housing Survey for Philadelphia, the paper does not find any evidence
that existing racial differences in residential location in Philadelphia decrease the
homeownership rate among African Americans. Rather, the empirical evidence
suggests that African-American residential location outcomes are associated with
lower than expected racial differences in homeownership. Therefore, after con-
trolling for neighborhood, racial differences in homeownership are larger than
originally believed, and the ability of racial differences in endowments to explain
hoeownership differences is more limited.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: R21, J15, D12
Keywords: Homeownership, Residential Location, Race, Credit Constraints,
Equity Risk
  1
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Large racial differences in homeownership have been a source of considerable concern among 
policy makers because homeownership choice may influence wealth accumulation, labor market 
outcomes, and even children's educational outcomes.  Racial differences in ownership rates may be 
affected by discrimination (Kain and Quigley, 1972), and extensive literatures examine the treatment of 
minorities by real estate broker and mortgage lenders  (see, for example, Yinger (1992) and Munnell et. 
al. (1996)).  At the same time, homeownership is associated with income and wealth. African-Americans 
have lower income and wealth than whites on average in the United States and that may also contribute to 
the racial differences in homeownership.   
The role that income and wealth differences play in contributing to racial differences in 
homeownership is well documented. Wachter and Megbolugbe (1992) and Painter, Gabriel, and Meyers 
(2001a) examine the influence of racial differences in income on homeownership and the transition to 
homeownership, respectively.  Both find that endowment differences explain a substantial portion of the 
racial differences.1  Duca and Rosenthal (1994) and Linneman and Wachter (1989) both find evidence 
that downpayment constraints have a substantial affect on homeownership and that credit constraints 
matter more than income in determining homeownership.2 Moreover, African-American homeownership 
rates were found to be significantly more responsive to changes in income (Wachter and Megbolugbe, 
1992) and downpayment constraints (Gyourko, Linneman, and Wachter, 1999). 
In most American metropolitan areas, many minorities are segregated into central cities, and the 
literature on racial segregation demonstrates that the level of observed segregation cannot be explained by 
income differences alone (Kain, 1976, 1992; Massey and Denton, 1993; DeRango, 1999).  Gabriel and 
Rosenthal (1989) examine residential location choice in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area and find 
considerable evidence that the influences of socio-economic and demographic characteristics on location 
outcomes differ dramatically by race.3  Specifically, African-Americans are much less likely to alter their 
residential location based on changes in these characteristics.  Similarly, Waddell (1992) finds for Dallas-
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Fort Worth that African-Americans are much less likely to suburbanize than whites as their incomes 
increase.4 
A reasonable question to ask is whether racial differences in residential location, reflected by the 
high and persistent level of segregation in American metropolitan areas, also contributes to the large 
racial differences in U.S. homeownership rates. One hypothesis is that racial differences in residential 
location may limit the homeownership opportunities of African-Americans to locations with higher equity 
risk, concentrated poverty, and an associated low value of homeownership. Therefore, racial segregation 
and housing market discrimination may aggravate racial differences in homeownership rates. On the other 
hand, equity risk, higher poverty rates, and other negative neighborhood attributes are expected to lower 
the price of owner-occupied housing.  The incidence of homeownership among African-American 
households may actually increase in poor neighborhoods with low prices since many African-American 
households face substantial income and down payment constraints in purchasing housing.5  Moreover,  
discrimination in the market for owner-occupied housing often involves steering by real estate agents 
(Turner and Mickelsons, 1992), and as a result African-Americans that attempt to purchase owner-
occupied housing may experience more segregation into poor quality neighborhoods than African-
American renters. 
No scholarly study has attempted to answer this question.  Painter, Gabriel and Meyers (2001b), 
Waddell (1992), and Gyourko, Linneman, and Wachter (1997) examine residential location and tenure 
choice in a single empirical model.  Gyourko, Linneman, and Wachter (1997) find that African-
Americans are more likely to own in the central city in a national sample of households.  Alternatively, 
Painter, Gabriel, and Meyers (2001b) find that minority renters who reside in Los Angeles county are 
more likely to transition to homeownership if they are moving to San Bernardino county as opposed to 
moving within Los Angeles.  However, none of these papers examine whether differences in the attributes 
of specific residential locations actually influence the homeownership decision.6 
In this paper, we provide such a test.  We adopt a nested multinomial logit framework to estimate 
the decisions of residential location and tenure choice jointly using the metropolitan sample of the 
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American Housing Survey for Philadelphia in 1985. In this model, tenure choice is modeled such that 
the homeownership decision is made while considering alternative subsets of residential location options. 
The resulting estimates are used to conduct policy simulations in order to assess the effect of demographic 
changes within the population and the effect of changes in residential location options on racial 
differences in homeownership rates.  We do not find any evidence that residential location outcomes 
lower the rate of homeownership among African-American households in our sample.  Rather, the 
estimates indicate that racial differences in the 1985 homeownership rate for the Philadelphia 
metropolitan area were limited or mitigated by racial differences in residential location. These findings 
raise doubts about the findings of previous studies that racial differences in homeownership may be 
predominantly explained by racial differences in endowments.  After controlling for neighborhood, racial 
differences in homeownership are larger than originally believed, and endowments explain less than half 
of the larger homeownership differences. 
The reader should not attempt to draw conclusions about why African-American households are 
concentrated in apparently lower quality residential locations.  One possible conjecture is that African-
American households self-sort into poorer and lower quality neighborhoods in order to gain access to 
affordable owner-occupied housing.  Alternative interpretations involving racial discrimination and 
steering, however, are equally plausible.  The steering of African American household’s into lower 
quality neighborhoods where housing price is low would have the same effect as self-sorting.  A low price 
level among the restricted housing alternatives may mitigate downpayment and income constraints and 
lead to higher homeownership rates.  In fact, if steering is more severe in the owner-occupied housing 
market, African-American owners might be concentrated in poor quality locations even if there were no 
endowment differences between white and African-American households. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the econometric models to be used in the 
test. Section 3 describes the data set. Section 4 presents empirical results from estimations and 
simulations. Section 5 is a brief conclusion. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
Three tenure choice models are estimated: Model I, a basic model that controls for household 
characteristics and is comparable to traditional models, such as Linneman and Wachter (1989); Model II, 
which includes additional controls for the characteristics of each household's residential location, such as 
percent of households in poverty and percent of African-American, and assumes that decisions on 
residential location are exogenous to the tenure choice; and Model III, which considers the influence of 
residential location options on homeownership endogenously based on a nested multinomial logit 
specification. 
While Model I allows us to compare our results with existing literatures, Models II and III are the 
focus of the paper and are intended to address the question of whether residential location choices 
contribute to or mitigate racial differences in homeownership.  The results of model II in which 
residential location is assumed to be exogenous offer fairly straightforward interpretations.  For example, 
if exposure to a high poverty rate location lowers homeownership for both whites and African-Americans, 
the fact that African-Americans reside in locations with higher poverty rates than white households 
contributes to racial differences in homeownership.  However, the interpretation of the results from Model 
II is quite limited due to the assumption that residential location choice is exogenous in a household's 
tenure choice decision.   
The nested multinomial logit model provides us with a coherent framework to test whether 
residential location options influence racial differences in homeownership.  In Model III, a nested 
multinomial logit model, the value of specific residential location options depend upon whether a 
household resides in owner-occupied or rental housing.  A household's tenure choice decision is made 
while accounting for the relative value of the residential location options simultaneously.   In other words, 
we can view the nested decision making process as such that a decision on residential location is made 
while considering its potential impact on the home ownership decision. The structure of nested 
multinomial logit model is described below. 
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2.1  A Multinomial Model of Tenure and Residential Location Choice 
In the nested multinomial logit, a hierarchy of choices is established. However, at each choice 
level, an individual has full information on all opportunities that are available at the lower level choices. 7  
In this paper, tenure choice is specified as the upper level in the hierarchy, and residential location is the 
lower level in the hierarchy.8  The expected utility for a specific outcome may be decomposed into two 
pieces:  one representing the utility arising directly from the tenure choice and the second representing the 
utility arising from a specific residential location conditional on tenure choice.  Individual i’s expected 
utility (V) may be written as  
 ijt t i t j iV X Z Xα β= +  (1) 
where t indexes for tenure status such that t=o if owner-occupied housing, or t=r if rental housing; ao for 
owner-occupied housing is the relationship between household characteristics X and the propensity to 
reside in owner-occupied housing, ar for rental housing is initialized to zero; j is an index representing 
residential location; and bt is the relationship between the utility associated with a location and location 
attributes Z for a given tenure outcome t.  Note that the location attributes are interacted with household 
characteristics allowing the relationship between attributes and utility to vary by those household 
characteristics. 
This empirical model provides a fairly complete description of the choice process and the 
mechanisms by which residential location choice may directly and indirectly shape the decision to own a 
home.  The utility level associated with specific residential locations is captured by the second term in 
equation (1), and these levels vary across tenure choice and types of households.  Differences in the value 
of specific attributes across tenure enter into the tenure choice equation.  For example, some residential 
locations may be highly desirable to a household if they choose to rent, but less desirable if they choose to 
own.  If such a household derives substantial benefits from homeownership, the household may forgo the 
highly desirable (conditional on renting) location and own in a very different place. 
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Following McFadden (1978), the nested multinomial logit can be estimated consistently using a 
two-stage approach.  In the first stage, the lower level choice (i.e., the residential location model) is 
estimated as a multinomial logit conditional on tenure choice.  The representative utility of residential 
location choice for each individual household is then summarized by an "inclusive value" (it is also 
known as "inclusive utility") calculated based on the conditional estimates from the lower level choice 
models. In the second stage, the tenure choice model is estimated as a simple logit by adding the inclusive 
value obtained from the first stage estimation as an additional explanatory variable. Thus, the expected 
utility offered by the set of residential location options is accounted in the upper level tenure choice 
estimation. 
The inclusive value is calculated as the log of the denominator on the conditional submodel for 
owner-occupied versus rental housing, such that ˆLog Exp iit j t
j
I  =   Z Xβ     ∑ , where I is the inclusive 
value, Z represents residential location attributes, βˆ  is a vector of estimated coefficients for residential 
location attributes during the first state estimation, X represents household characteristics over which 
coefficients may vary, j indexes for alternatives of residential location choice, t indexes for tenure status, 
and i indexes for individual household.   
 The first stage residential location model involves choices among quite aggregated alternatives, 
which is often the case for multinomial choice models.  Over aggregation can bias estimation results.  
Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) suggest including measures of alternative size and variation in the level of 
utility offered within an aggregated alternative.  In the case of residential location choice, alternative size 
might reasonably be captured by the number of owner-occupied or rental housing units located within a 
spatial alternative.   
The measurement of variation in utility level is a more difficult task.  Under an assumption of free 
mobility across alternatives, differences in the utility level across location should be fully capitalized into 
land values.  If so, no differences in utility level exist for equal agents in alternative locations, and the 
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variation should be zero.  On the other hand, utility differences may exist if they are only partially 
capitalized into land values.  In this case, a correlation may exist between housing prices and the utility 
opportunities offered.  Therefore, we use the variation in housing prices across alternatives to proxy for 
variation in the utility level provided. 
2.2 Household Level Control Variables 
Model I is a standard tenure choice model that controls for detailed household demographic 
characteristics as well as financial characteristics. The household demographic characteristics include 
family structure, age and education of the head of household and spouse if present. The household 
financial characteristics include both family income and the downpayment constraint in housing demand. 
Unconstrained housing demand as a homeowner is not observed if the household resides in rental housing 
or the household purchased less housing than desired due to a downpayment constraint. We construct a 
variable indicating whether a household is expected to face a downpayment constraint based on predicted 
assets and predicted optimal housing demand. Finally, for a robustness check, an instrument was 
developed for family income based on the estimation of employment and earnings regressions for each 
family member. The construction of the downpayment constraint and the family income variables are 
described in the Appendix. The Appendix also includes all estimations that are used to construct these 
variables.  All coefficient estimates in the tenure choice model are allowed to vary by race.   
2.3  Location Attributes 
Models II and III include controls for the attributes of either the household's actual residential 
location or the residential location options that are available, respectively.  The two models will include 
standard location attributes, such as the racial or income composition of a location or whether the location 
is located in the central city.  In addition, the models will include two constructed variables in order to 
capture the overall quality or amenity level of each location and the equity risk associated with a location.  
Both variables are constructed using the estimates from standard house value and rental price models that 
control for the physical characteristics of the housing unit and location dummy variables.  The estimated 
coefficients on the location dummy variables are price fixed effects.  These fixed effects capture the price 
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level after controlling for the physical quantity and quality of the housing unit.  This fixed effect 
captures the market premium offered for housing in a given location and provides a proxy for the amenity 
level associated with that location.9  The ratio of the rental and owner-occupied price fixed effects are 
used as a proxy for equity risk.  High equity risk should lower the value of owner-occupied housing 
relative to rents on similar properties since owners must bear the equity risk associated with the 
property.10  Model II simply includes these location attributes as linear regressors along with the 
household variables discussed above. 
As shown in equation (1), Model III uses the location attributes to describe the expected utility 
associated with a specific residential location choice.  The location attributes do not directly enter the 
second stage tenure choice equation; rather, these attributes are included in the residential location model 
and only enter the tenure choice model through the inclusive value.  The location attributes are included 
directly in the multinomial logit specification plus the attributes are interacted with specific household 
characteristics:  head of household race, marital status, and education level.  Note that as with the tenure 
choice equation, all coefficient estimates are allowed to vary by race.  For example, in the case of marital 
status, location attributes are interacted with a variable representing marital status if the head of household 
is white and a second variable representing marital status if the head of household if African-American. 
Finally, Model III includes a third constructed variable in the first stage residential location 
choice.  A gravity model is estimated and used to construct a measure of job access.  The likelihood of 
choosing a given residential location is expected to decline with job access, but it is assumed that the 
homeownership choice is not directly influenced by job access.11  In addition, the importance of job 
access may depend upon the expected probability of employment for the household head and spouse, and 
the predicted probabilities of employment are interacted with job access in the residential location model.  
The Appendix presents a detailed discussion on each of these constructed variables, as well as the 
estimates that are used to construct these variables. 
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3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The base sample for this analysis is the 1985 Metropolitan Area (Metro) sample of the American 
Housing Survey (AHS) for Philadelphia.  The Metro sample of the AHS contains detailed housing 
characteristics and the location of the housing unit down to zones of approximately 100,000 in 
population.  The city of Philadelphia is divided into 13 zones, and the rest of the metropolitan area is 
divided into 22 additional zones.  It also contains information on family structure, family member 
demographics, and limited labor market variables for each member.  The 1985 survey also included a 
commuting subsection in the survey, which collected the employment location of every employed family 
member using the same spatial zones that were used to record residential location.12  
Specifically, the survey data provides information on characteristics of the reference person, 
characteristics of the reference person's spouse if married, whether the household includes relatives of the 
reference person, number of individuals in the household by age, family education level,13 family income, 
and information to be used to construct the downpayment constraint variable.  As discussed earlier, the 
amenity/price fixed effect and the equity risk proxy are constructed for each zone by using the AHS to 
estimate separate hedonic price models for owner-occupied house value and monthly rent.  These models 
control for a broad away of housing attributes as well as zone fixed effects. 
In addition, the Department of Housing and Urban Development provided a list of 1980 census 
tracts that comprise each of the Metro sample zones, and this list was modified to account for changes in 
the census tract definitions between 1980 and 1990.  Using this list and the Basic Summary Table Files 
(STF3) from the 1990 U.S. census, the following variables are generated for each Metro sample zones: 
percent residents in poverty, percent African-American households, number of owner-occupied and rental 
properties, and the coefficient of variation for house price and annual rent across all tracts in a zone.  The 
zones were also used to construct a dummy variable for whether the household resided in the central city 
in 1985.  Finally, the 1990 Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) is used to estimate the 
gravity model for the AHS sample zones in the Philadelphia metropolitan area, see the Appendix.14  
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These tables were used to construct average travel time and commuting flows between the AHS sample 
zones, as well as total residential population and employment within each zone.   
For all variables, the names, descriptions, and means by race are shown in Table 1.  In the 
sample, the racial difference in owner-occupancy is 18 percentage points.  Of course, the differences may 
in part be explained by differences in household characteristics.  In the sample, African-Americans have 
less education, lower marriage rates, lower family income, and are more likely to face a downpayment 
constraint.  Residential location also varies by race as captured by the zone attributes.  On average, 
African-Americans reside in locations with a higher percentage of African-American residents, a higher 
percentage of residents in poverty, lower overall amenity levels (as captured by lower quality adjusted 
price levels),15 and higher equity risk (as captured by lower relative values for owner-occupied housing).  
In addition, African-Americans are more likely to reside in the central city.16 
Table 2 presents the mean location attributes by race and by whether a household is an owner-
occupant.  The first two columns represent the mean attributes for white owners and renters, and the third 
column represents the difference between white owners and renters.  The next three columns display the 
same information for African-American households.  On average, white owner occupants reside in 
locations with lower rates of integration, and lower rates of poverty.  In addition, white owners are less 
likely to reside in the city as compared to white renters.  These results are not replicable for the African-
American sample.  African-American owner occupants reside in locations with higher percent African-
American, higher equity risk, and lower amenity levels overall as compared to African-American renters.  
The last column shows the difference between the third and sixth columns. From the last column we can 
see that the white owner vs. renter differences and African-American owner vs. renter differences are 
significantly different from each other for all variables except percent poverty. These results illustrate the 
importance of considering residential location when examining tenure choice and allowing location to be 
endogenous.  African-Americans reside in locations that have higher poverty rates, lower overall quality 
as measured by price level, and higher equity risk.  These factors are likely to influence both the costs and 
benefits of owner-occupied housing relative to rental housing.  Moreover, homeowners tend to reside in 
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different types of neighborhoods than renters, and these differences vary systematically by race.   This 
finding suggests that residential location is endogenous to the tenure choice and that ignoring this 
endogeneity may be very problematic in any analysis of racial differences in homeownership. 
 
4. ESTIMATION AND SIMULATION RESULTS  
4.1  Residential Location Choice Model 
Table 3 presents the estimates from the first stage multinomial logit model which analyzes 
residential location choice conditional on the tenure choice.  Note that the first stage estimates the 
conditional probability of a residential location choice given the tenure choice and that the coefficients for 
the first stage models are estimable only up to a scale factor. In addition, these estimates should be 
interpreted with care because they will suffer from selection bias if location choice is endogenous to 
tenure choice. The estimates from the first stage logit are used to construct an inclusive value representing 
the relative utility of owning versus renting for each residential location and individual in the sample. The 
inclusive value will be added to the second stage tenure model, which will provide consistent estimates 
for describing household tenure choice.   
The coefficients are presented in four panels based on the following categories: white owners, 
African-American owners, white renters, and African-American renters. For each panel, the first column 
contains the estimated level coefficients for the households described by the omitted categories, i.e., 
single individuals without a high school degree. The second column contains the difference between the 
coefficients for single and married households, and the third and fourth columns contain the interaction of 
coefficients for the reference individual being a high school or college graduate, respectively. The last 
three columns contain the probability of employment and its interaction with marital status for head of 
household and spouse, respectively. 
The rows contain the location attributes. The first two rows include the controls for aggregation 
bias, i.e., option size (number of units) and variance of option utility (variation in price). No information 
is available to capture variation in size or utility based on observed characteristics. Therefore these two 
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variables are simply included without interactions. The next five rows include percent households 
African-American, percent households in poverty, price level conditional on tenure, equity risk, and 
central city, which are interacted with marital status and education.  Finally, the last row contains a 
gravity-model-based measure of job access, and this measure of job access is interacted with the 
probability of employment for the reference individual, marital status, and the probability of the reference 
person’s spouse if married. 
It is important to remember when interpreting the results in this table that the model includes a 
control for the amenity level in each zone.  This control is based on the location fixed effect from a 
hedonic price estimation.  If a type of household is has the average willingness to pay for these 
unobserved amenity variables and has free access to the metropolitan housing market, there should be no 
relationship between price level and the desirability of a location because the cost of the unobserved 
variables simply equals the value place on them by the household.  Moreover, the influence of all other 
attributes should be interpreted in the context that price level is held constant.  For example, if equity risk 
decreases, the decrease in equity risk must be associated with a change in unobserved amenity variables 
since price is held constant.  In essence, the willingness to pay for other attributes is measured in the 
willingness to give up quality on the unobserved amenity variables.  Moreover, if there are constraints to 
mobility within the metropolitan area, such as racial discrimination or mortgage redlining, across group 
location differences may reflect these constraints rather than differences in willingness to pay.  This 
analysis cannot distinguish between across group differences in preferences and such constraints. 
For white owners occupants (Panel A), unmarried individuals without a high school education 
avoid locations with high concentrations of blacks, expensive quality adjusted housing prices, and high 
equity risk. Other things equal, these individuals will reside in a central city location over a suburban 
location.  On the other hand, married individuals tend to reside in suburban locations.  Also, as education 
level rises, households loose their aversion to locations with high minority concentrations, high price 
levels and high equity risk.  Therefore, households with high education levels are more likely in zones 
with high amenity levels even after controlling for the higher price levels in those zones.  Moreover, high 
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education households are more likely to reside in locations with a high concentration of minorities or 
high equity risk potentially because they are less willing to sacrifice overall amenity levels in order to 
avoid locations with these attributes. The exact view of these households towards minority neighborhoods 
or equity risk is obscured by the fact that high education level households appear to place a higher value 
on amenities. Employment access increases the likelihood of a household residing in a location, but the 
role of employment access falls with the probability of employment for single individuals, as well as with 
the spouse’s probability of employment for married couples. Individuals with a high probability of 
employment may be less likely to sacrifice other features of the location in order to have good job access.   
For black households (Panel B), the basic findings are the same except for the effect of percent 
black. Black households are more likely to reside in locations with a high percentage of minorities, and 
there is some evidence (significant for high school graduates, but not for college graduate) that the effect 
actually increases with education.  Note that the effect of equity risk for non-high school graduates, the 
central city effects, and the effect of the spouse’s probability of employment are not statistically 
significant.  Naturally, these estimates describe location outcomes and can be interpreted as representing 
preferences only if African Americans have complete and unconstrained access to all locations within the 
metropolitan area.  If African Americans access to housing is constrained by discrimination and 
geographic steering, these estimates will represent a composite of African American preferences and the 
effect of external constraints on location choice.   
For white renters (Panel C), unmarried, uneducated whites are less likely to reside in locations 
with high minority concentrations, high poverty percentage, high price levels, but more likely to reside in 
central city locations and locations with equity risk.  In principle, renters should not care about equity 
risk, but the reversal of the coefficients on the equity risk variables relative to the owner-occupant results 
appears reasonable because they may prefer to reside in a location with higher equity risk and the higher 
amenity variables that are implied when price is held constant. As with white and African-American 
owners, the likelihood of residing in zones with high amenity levels increases with education level.  As a 
result, the effects for percent black and percent poverty are reversed or at least eroded in size as education 
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level increases. However, renters develop an aversion to equity risk as education increases, but the 
increase in the value of unobserved amenity variables should imply an increased willingness for renters to 
accept locations with equity risk.  Possibly, households expect to move within the same location.  High 
education households may foresee owning in the future and choose to avoid high equity risk areas.   
Black renters (Panel D) are more likely to live in locations with a high percentage of African-
American households and less likely to live in locations with equity risk.  The standard relationship 
between education level and the influence of price level occurs for black renters, and there is also a 
corresponding increase in the likelihood of black renters residing in a location with a high poverty rate.  
For both black and white renters, employment access appears to make a location more attractive, but as 
with owners the affect decreases with the probability of unemployment.   
4.2  Tenure Choice Model 
Table 4 contains the estimates from three separate estimations: Model I, a standard model that 
contains no spatial information; Model II, a model that includes five key exogenous residential location 
attributes: percent black, percent poverty, price level, equity risk, and central city; and Model III, a nested 
multinomial logit model17 that consider residential location choices endogenously through the inclusive 
utility variable obtained from the first stage residential location logit estimation.18 In general, results 
across all three specifications support the key findings of previous research on homeownership, namely 
that being credit constrained lowers the likelihood of owning, a higher household income increases the 
likelihood of owning, and the effect of facing a downpayment constraint is larger for minorities.   
The first two models are potentially biased.  The standard model (Model I) omits location and to 
the extent that location influences tenure choice the model suffers from omitted variable bias.  Model II 
controls for location, but may be biased in that location is endogenous to tenure choice.  In comparing 
Model I to the consistent estimates offered by Model III, we observe almost no change in the white 
coefficients on credit constraints and family income.  The racial interactions, however, do appear to suffer 
from omitted variable bias.  The interaction coefficient on downpayment constraint appears biased 
upwards by over 10%.  The interaction coefficient on family income is biased upwards by 80% leading to 
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a result that is significant at the 10% level in Model I, but insignificant in Model III.  In comparing 
Model II to Model III, the biases are potentially even more problematic.  The biases on the racial 
interaction are still considerable:  approximately 10% for the constraint variable and 50% for family 
income, and the level coefficients also suffer from substantial bias in this specification.  The estimated 
coefficients on both the constraint and family income variables are biased upwards by about 15%.  
Clearly, the simple inclusion of controls for actual residential location on the right hand side of a tenure 
choice model is not an appropriate solution in this context. 
In Model II, which includes location attributes as exogenous explanatory variables, the 
amenity/price index, percent black, and equity risk all reduce the likelihood of owning.  For the 
amenity/price index, African-Americans tend to reside in lower quality locations, which should decrease 
racial differences in homeownership.  However, percent black and equity risk only reduce the likelihood 
of owning for white households.  The sum of the white coefficients and the racial interactions are 
effectively zero for these two variables.  For these two variables, interpretation depends on the point of 
comparison.  If the typical location of white households forms the basis for comparison, the fact that 
African-American households reside in more integrated locations and in locations with higher equity risk 
has little effect on racial differences in homeownership.  Finally, poverty rate in a location lowers the 
likelihood of homeownership for African-Americans, but not for whites. Again using the residential 
location of white households in the sample as a baseline, African-American households are exposed to 
higher poverty rates, which would tend to increase racial differences in homeownership. 
One limitation of Model II is that the residential location is considered as an exogenous choice in 
the tenure choice decision. Presumably, an optimal tenure choice should be made while fully considering 
the impact of residential location choice, and vise versa.  The nested multinomial model provides a 
coherent framework to analyze household’s tenure choice and residential location choice endogenously. 
The results for the nested multinomial logit provide strong support of the hypothesis that residential 
location choices are endogenous to the tenure choice. The coefficient on the inclusive value is positive 
and significantly different from zero which implies location matters in the owner-occupancy decision.  It 
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is also significantly different from one which implies that the complete choice process cannot be 
modeled as a simple multinomial logit over all combinations of residential location and homeownership 
options. 
However, a statistically significant coefficient on the inclusive value alone may not lead to a 
conclusion that residential location options influence racial differences in homeownership.  Such a 
conclusion also requires a comparison of the estimated inclusive values across the white and African-
American samples.  The mean inclusive value for the white sample is -0.556 with a standard error of 
0.469, and the mean for the African-American sample is 2.321 with a standard error of 0.561.19  The 
difference in inclusive utilities between the white and the African-American samples is 2.877 with a 
standard error of 0.695.  On average, the set of options available in this metropolitan area increase the 
likelihood of homeownership among African-American households relative to whites.20   
A number of alternative specifications were considered for key household characteristics, and 
partial results are shown in table 5. The constraint variable was constructed either using an alternative 
discount rate or by using directly estimated coefficients from a model of household assets using the 
Survey of Consumer Finance.  The number of family members with a given relationship to the reference 
person was used to replace the binary indicator for whether someone of that relationship was present.  
Years-of-education was used to replace educational attainment.21  Finally, family income was replaced 
with an instrumental variable.  The basic results are robust to these alternative specifications.22    
4.3  Simulation Results 
In order to assess the magnitude of the effects discussed above, as well as to examine the 
underlying factors behind these effects, we conduct simulation analyses using the estimated models.   
First, the base model (model 1) is used to examine the effect of credit constraints on racial differences in 
homeownership.  For the sample, the model predicts a 22 percentage point difference between white and 
African American homeownership rates.  The elimination of credit constraints within the sample drive the 
racial difference down by 77 percent or down to 5 percentage points.  This result is consistent with 
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previous findings by Gyouko, Linneman and Wachter (1999) that credit constraints and other 
endowment differences can explain a very large portion of observed racial differences in homeownership.  
For the model in which location is assumed to be exogenous (model 2), the simulations simply 
examine the effect of altering the residential location attributes experienced by the households in the 
sample. Table 6 contains simulations based on the model in which residential location is treated as 
exogenous.  As shown in Table 1, African-Americans in this sample reside in locations that contain a 
higher percentage of African-American households, contain a higher percentage of households in poverty, 
have lower neighborhood quality as captured by the amenity/price index, have higher equity risk, and 
more likely to be in the central city.  This simulation eliminates these differences by altering the value of 
these variables for either the white or minority sample so that the mean values of a location attribute are 
equal for the white and African-American samples. 
The two largest effects in Table 6 arise from the modification of percent households in poverty 
and the amenity/price index. A decrease in the neighborhood poverty faced by African-Americans to the 
level faced by white households on average lowers predicted racial differences in homeownership. After 
controlling for the overall amenity level and racial composition, African-Americans are much less likely 
than white households to own in neighborhoods with high poverty rates. Since the simulation controls for 
the amenity/price index, the effect of poverty rates is measured relative to the associated decrease in 
unobserved neighborhood quality that must occur in order to hold prices constant while poverty rates 
decline. An adjustment to the amenity/price index appears to work in the opposite direction.  When 
African-Americans face the higher prices for housing that are associated with better neighborhood 
amenities, racial differences in homeownership rates increase.23  Table 6 also shows the effect of 
eliminating average differences for all attributes considered simultaneously. Racial differences in 
homeownership increase moderately in this simulation.   
These results provide mixed evidence of the hypothesis that the residential location of African-
American households limits their homeownership opportunities.  Using white household residential 
locations as a baseline, the fact that minorities reside in locations with high poverty rate does appear to 
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limit homeownership opportunities.  However, the overall amenity level associated with a location 
appears to have the opposite effect in that either the lower prices or lower levels of racial discrimination  
in poorer quality locations increase minority homeownership.  These two effects cancel each out when all 
attribute differences are eliminated. This simulation shows an increase in racial differences in 
homeownership suggesting that the overall pattern of residential location appears to mitigate 
homeownership differences, but the size of the effect is much smaller. 
Table 7 examines the effect of location on homeownership using the estimates from the nested 
multinomial logit model. The inclusive value represents the value placed on homeownership based on the 
location opportunities available.  The mean inclusive values for the white and African-American sub-
samples are -0.556 and 2.321, respectively, indicating that location outcomes increase African-American 
homeownership relative to white households.  In order to quantify this effect, row 1 contains the 
simulated probabilities of homeownership when inclusive values are adjusted so that the mean inclusive 
value is the same for the white and the African-American samples. This adjustment increases racial 
differences in homeownership by 17.6 percent.  In other words, the residential location outcomes of 
minority households appear to increase their likelihood of homeownership and as a result mitigate racial 
differences in homeownership. 
This finding raises some questions concerning previous findings that credit constraints can 
explain the majority of racial differences in homeownership.  Existing studies do not consider the fact that 
minorities tend to purchase homes in different types of locations than whites.  If we examine the predicted 
racial differences while African American household locations were determined in a manner similar to 
white households, racial differences in the sample increase to 39 percentage points.  The elimination of 
credit constraints within the sample decreases racial differences in homeownership to 22 percentage 
points.  Over half of the racial differences remain. By ignoring residential location, these studies attribute 
too much importance to racial differences in endowments and potentially understate the extent to which 
race itself limits access to owner-occupied housing. 
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In the nested multinomial logit, the racial differences in the inclusive value can arise from two 
sources: racial differences in the household characteristics that are included in the residential location 
choice specification, or the variation in location attributes for which the relative value in homeownership 
varies by race. The location choice model depends on both marital status and educational attainment, and 
the white and African-American samples differ on these variables.  The second row in Table 7 adjusts the 
inclusive values so that the mean inclusive values are the same by race for each sub-sample, e.g. single 
and head does not have a high school degree.  The basic results are unaffected by this change.  Finally, 
simulations are conducted to examine whether the racial differences in inclusive values can be attributed 
to racial differences in either marital status or educational attainment in the sample. The last two rows 
include simulations in which the inclusive value is modified by adjusting the educational attainment and 
marital status variables in the sample so that the means of these two variables are the same by race. This 
adjustment does not affect racial differences in homeownership.  Therefore, racial differences in 
educational attainment and marital status cannot explain the results in the first row of this table.  There is 
no evidence that the influence of residential location choice on relative homeownership rates can be 
explained by differences in educational attainment or marital status. 
Rather, racial differences in the pattern of location outcomes appear to be the major factor in 
mitigating racial differences in homeownership.  Table 8 explores the role of location outcomes by 
examining the affect of possible changes in the location choice set on racial differences in 
homeownership rates.  In these simulations, the location attributes are changed, rather than the 
characteristics of the white and/or African-American samples.  The first four columns examine a ten 
percent increase in each location attributes.  A simple increase in these characteristics does not affect 
homeownership rates in any substantial way.   
The last four columns examine a ten percent reduction in the standard error associated with mean 
location attributes.  Specifically, the value of an attribute in each location is shifted towards the mean 
value of that attribute across all locations in order to preserve the mean of the attribute but decrease the 
variation.  A reduction in the variation across locations increases racial differences in homeownership for 
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every attribute.  The effect for percent African-American households, percent in poverty, and the 
amenity/price index are on the order of 13 to 15 percentage points and increase racial differences by over 
60 percent.  A reduction in variation in equity risk has a similar effect, but the effect is smaller possibly 
due to an interaction between equity risk and the high levels of credit constraints among African-
American households.  It is important to note that our analysis examines a single market and does not 
allow us to compare households making choices in the face of alternative sets of options.  Rather, these 
results are based on differences in outcomes across household types.  The parameter estimates from the 
residential location model predict higher relative benefits from homeownership for African Americans in 
the types of neighborhoods that are eliminated when the variation in attributes is reduced.   
The simulations in table 8 are partial equilibrium in nature.  They do not consider the possibility 
that a metropolitan wide change in one location attribute may influence equilibrium outcomes for a 
second attribute.  While a general equilibrium analysis of this problem is beyond the scope of the paper, 
one assumption implicit in the partial equilibrium analysis is considered further.  The estimations control 
for the price level of each location through the amenity/price index, and therefore a simulated change in 
an attribute is conducted holding price level fixed.  For example, if a decrease in percent poverty is 
expected to increase the prices in a given location, these simulations assume that unobserved 
neighborhood attributes are simultaneously decreased in order to leave the price level unaffected. 
The third and sixth rows of table 8 address this concern.  Specifically, the relationship between 
price level and other location attributes was estimated on the sample of zones using the price fixed effects 
from the housing price hedonic estimation as the dependent variable.24  A significant relationship was 
found for both percent poverty and equity risk.  The estimated relationship was used to adjust the price 
level variable as the percent poverty and equity risk variables were modified.  Again in a partial 
equilibrium framework, simulations with this price level adjustment can be interpreted as the affect of 
changing one attribute while holding other attributes fixed including unobserved neighborhood quality.  
The simulations based on this price adjustment yield very similar results to the simulations in which the 
price level is held constant. 
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These simulations suggest that racial and income segregation across the metropolitan area plays 
an important role in creating the observed effects on homeownership.  One possible explanation is that 
African-American households self-sort into poorer and lower quality neighborhoods in order to gain 
access to affordable owner-occupied housing.  Under this possibility, a decrease in the variation across 
residential location options increases racial differences in homeownership rates possibly because it limits 
choice hindering the self-sorting of African-Americans.  Alternative interpretations involving racial 
discrimination and steering, however, are equally plausible.  The steering of African American 
household’s into lower quality neighborhoods where housing price is low would have the same effect as 
self-sorting.  A low price level among the restricted housing alternatives may mitigate downpayment and 
income constraints and lead to higher homeownership rates.  In fact, if steering is more severe in the 
owner-occupied housing market, African-American owners might be concentrated in poor quality 
locations rather than choosing homeownership based on the low price of housing in those locations.  In 
this case, a decrease in variation across locations limits the ability of real estate agents to steer minority 
homebuyers towards specific types of neighborhoods. 
 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study estimates a tenure choice model using the 1985 Philadelphia sample of the American 
Housing Survey. The tenure choice is examined while allowing the residential location choice to be 
endogenous and controlling for the residential opportunities available throughout the metropolitan area.  
The study supports standard results in the literature.  Family income and a prediction that the household 
faces a downpayment constraint are both significant determinants of homeownership, and the 
downpayment constraint has an especially large effect on African-Americans households’ 
homeownership decision.  Our simulations indicate that racial differences in homeownership are reduced 
by 17 percentage points or by 77 percent when credit constraints are eliminated. 
Using the tenure choice model, the study examines whether racial differences in homeownership 
are explained in part by the high levels of racial segregation observed in American metropolitan areas 
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and/or the concentration of African Americans into areas with high poverty and poor neighborhood 
amenities. These factors may limit the value of African-American homeownership opportunities, or when 
faced with the lower prices and potentially lower levels of discrimination associated with these 
neighborhoods African-Americans may increase homeownership relative to comparable white households 
in more highly priced and exclusive locations. 
The influence of location choice appears to mitigate racial differences in homeownership rates, 
rather than contribute to these differences.  The predicted inclusive value from the nested multinomial 
logit captures the advantages of homeownership that arise due to the location opportunities available.  The 
average inclusive value for the African-American sample exceeds the value for the white sample, and the 
elimination of these differences increases racial differences in homeownership rates by 17 percentage 
points. An important implication of these findings is that previous studies may have overstated the 
importance of endowment differences.  This paper finds that credit constraints can explain 77 percent of 
racial differences in homeownership using a traditional model, but when homeownership rates are 
compared while controlling for location, credit constraints explain less than half of the predicted racial 
differences in homeownership rates.   
We also investigated which features of the opportunity set are behind the influence of location 
outcomes on homeownership differences. A series of simulations were conducted in which the variation 
in key location attributes was reduced leading to either less racial segregation, less concentration of 
poverty, and a more even distribution of the overall amenity level or equity risk.  In every one of these 
simulations, the reduction in variation increased racial differences in homeownership rates.  While this 
study only examines outcomes in one metropolitan area and cannot directly estimate the impact of 
differences in metropolitan structure, these simulations suggest that racial and income segregation across 
the metropolitan area plays an important role in creating the observed effects on homeownership 
The normative aspects of these conclusions are far from clear. These results might be interpreted 
positively in that residential segregation does not appear to negatively impact the likelihood of 
homeownership among African Americans.  At the same time, the location pattern of African American 
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homeowners should be a source of concern for policymakers.  At least in this sample, African American 
homeowners actually reside in lower quality (as measured by price level) and higher equity risk locations 
than African American renters.  Homeownership is an important wealth accumulation mechanism for 
American households.  However this mechanism may be severely limited if African Americans reside in 
locations where housing is unlikely to appreciate over time.  Moreover, homeownership has been 
advocated as a mechanism for improving the outcomes of minority youths, but the location pattern of 
African American homeowners may also negatively impact youths through both access to quality schools 
and peer group effects. 
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL MODEL SPECIFICATIONS AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
A1. Tenure Choice Specification and the Downpayment Constraint  
The household tenure choice specification follows standard approaches in the literature. As 
suggested by Englehart (1994), households may save in order to obtain a down payment, or savings may 
be depressed if households do not expect to be able to afford to purchase a residence that meets their 
desires.25 As a result, the tenure choice model is part of a simultaneous system involving a household’s 
decision to accumulate wealth and latent housing demand. A constraint variable is constructed based on 
reduced form estimates of each household's available assets and each household's demand for owner-
occupied housing if they did not face a down payment constraint. 
A constraint dummy variable is set to one if the family's predicted assets available for home 
purchase exceed a set fraction of the predicted optimal house value. Unconstrained households are 
defined as households that had at least twenty percent equity in their home at the time of purchase.  Using 
this sample, house value at the time of purchase is estimated as a function of family characteristics, 
residential location, and years since the purchase.  Predicted optimal house value is based on the resulting 
parameter estimates and the assumption that the number of years since the purchase equals zero, see 
Goodman and Kawai (1982) for an earlier example of this approach.  Predicted assets must equal 23 
percent of predicted optimal house value in order to allow for a 20 percent downpayment, as well as 
closing costs and possible points. 
Predicted assets are the sum of predicted housing equity and predicted liquid assets.  Housing 
equity is estimated as a function of family characteristics while correcting for sample selection into 
homeownership, which is a function of both family characteristics and residential location.  Housing 
equity is predicted for the entire sample of households using the model parameter estimates, and the 
predicted equity times the probability of homeownership is used as an instrument for housing wealth.  
The non-labor income estimation discussed earlier depends on variables that describe sources of non-
labor income.  Predicted incomes from liquid assets are based on the estimated non-labor income model 
under the assumption that the only sources of income are dividends and interest income.  Predicted liquid 
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assets for the entire sample are the predicted non-labor income from dividends or interest times the 
probability of having income from dividends or interest divided by an typical dividend rate of 0.03.  
Alternative constraint variables are also considered by raising the return rate to 0.05 to represent a 
traditional money market account and by using the coefficients from an estimated model of household 
assets from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finance.26 
As described earlier, the constraint variable is based on predicted optimal housing demand and 
predicted housing equity. Housing equity is calculated based on reported house value for homeowners 
with no mortgage or with a fixed rate mortgage since the AHS contains interest rates, year of the home 
purchase, and original mortgage amount.  Optimal housing demand is estimated using the purchase price 
of the housing unit for every homeowner who purchased their home with at least a 20 percent down 
payment.  Both the housing demand and home equity specifications include the same family variables as 
the tenure choice equation.   
The results of these estimations are shown in Table A1.  These results are simply reduced form 
estimations and are only used to generate instruments for the estimations reported in the body of the 
paper.  Also, note that predicted values used in later estimations do not depend on residential location.  
Rather, they are based on the sample average of the estimated location fixed effects. 
A2.  Instrument for Family Income 
Family labor income may also be endogenous if family members respond to homeownership 
requirements and opportunities by adjusting labor supply.  As a robustness check, an instrument is also 
developed for family predicted non-labor family income and predicted labor income for each family 
member.  First, an employment equation is estimated for each adult family member where employment 
depends on individual characteristics, family structure, and residential location fixed effects.  For 
employed family members, labor earnings are estimated as a function of individual characteristics, family 
structure, and employment location fixed effects, and the estimation is corrected for sample selection bias.  
Labor earnings are predicted for each family member and weighted by the probability of employment. 
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Both the employment and the labor earnings specification includes many individual 
characteristics including age with separate intercepts and slopes for each of the following age categories:  
16-18, 19-22, 23-55, 55-65, and 65 and older.  The specifications also depend on the presence of other 
family members for the reference person and the relationship to the reference person for all other family 
members. The labor earnings specification controls for sample selection bias using the Heckman two-step 
approach.  The results are shown in Table A2.  As discussed above, predicted employment probability 
and earnings are do not depend on employment or residential location. 
Non-labor income is generated by assets that may have been accumulated in order to finance the 
purchase of a home.  As a result, this portion of family income is replaced by the predicted amount from a 
reduced form model of non-labor income.   Non-labor income is estimated as a function of family 
characteristics including residential location fixed effects, and then predicted for each household at the 
average of the estimated fixed effects.  Non-labor income depends on the standard family characteristics 
in the homeownership equation plus residential location fixed effects. The estimated coefficients are 
shown in Table A1. 
A3.  Amenity/Price Indices and a Measure of Equity Risk 
Amenity/price indices are constructed for each location and tenure choice by estimating separate 
hedonic models of housing price for owners and monthly rent for renters using a log-log specification.  
First, a reduced form housing tenure choice model is estimated depending on family characteristics and 
residential location.  The estimates from the reduced form tenure choice model are used to calculate 
sample selection terms for the hedonic models. The hedonic models include the physical characteristics of 
the owner occupied or rental property, as well as residential location fixed effects. 
 i t j t t i i ti t =    +  +     +  p Xγ δ σ λ ε  (A.1) 
where the δ's are the location fixed effects, λ is the inverse mills ratio from the sample selection 
correction, and ε is an error term.  The amenity/price index in a given location and tenure is the 
appropriate fixed effect from the housing price or the rent models.27    
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The estimated fixed effects are included directly in the residential location (tenure choice) model 
as a measure of relative housing costs across locations (tenure). These measures provide controls for the 
overall amenity level in a location because other things equal these attributes should be capitalized into 
the price of both owner-occupied and rental housing.  In addition, the rental and sales price indices are 
used to construct a measure of equity risk.  Equity risk should lower the value of owner-occupied housing 
relative to rents on similar properties.  Equity risk in any location is estimated as the exponential of the 
rental fixed effect divided by the exponential of the sales fixed effect.  Tootell (1996) uses a similar 
measure of equity risk, median rents divided by median house value, but Tootell's measure does not 
control for differences in the quality of rental and owner-occupied housing stock in each location. 
The specification of the reduced form tenure choice equation includes the same family 
characteristics as the final tenure choice equation.  Both hedonic specifications include number of square 
feet, number of each type of room, ages, whether unit contains specific features like a garage, porch or 
fireplace, type of unit, and if a rental property whether utilities are included in the rent (See Table A3 for 
details). 
A4.  A Measure of Job Accessibility  
The residential location choice model also controls for the location to employment offered by 
each residential location.  A gravity model is estimated using the following specification 
 [ ]0Log Log Log Logj k P j E k t jk jk =  +  P  +   E + t  +F α α α α µ           (A.2) 
where F represents commuting flows, P represents population in location j, E represents employment in 
location k, t is the commuting time between j and k, and µ is an error term. The measure of job access for 
a given location is 
 tE
jkj k
k
A  = E tαα∑  (A.3) 
which may be included in the residential location choice problem as a location attribute. 
The 1990 Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) is used to estimate the gravity model 
for the AHS sample zones in the Philadelphia metropolitan area.  The number of automobile commuters 
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from one zone to another forms the dependent variable of the model, and the independent variables 
include number of households in the residential zone, number of jobs in the employment zone, and 
average peak commute time by automobile between the two zones.  The estimated coefficients and 
standard errors are -4.210 (0.727), 0.959 (0.046), 0.954 (0.055) and -2.789 (0.099) for the intercept, 
number of households, number of jobs, and commute time, respectively.28 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Means by Race 
Name Definition White Black 
TENURE Variable is one is resides in owner-occupied residence 0.619 0.439 
AGE Age in years, average of head and spouse if married 48.02 45.257 
MAR Variable is one if reference person married 0.565 0.310 
SEX Variable is one if reference person is male 0.693 0.462 
COLGRAD Variable is one if ref per and spouse are collage graduate 0.243 0.107 
HSGRAD Variable is one if high school graduate 0.547 0.546 
REFPRNT One if a parent resides with reference person 0.009 0.016 
REFCHLD One if children reside with reference person 0.458 0.545 
KIDSLT6 One if kids less than six are present in household 0.149 0.207 
CONST Variable is one if predict credit constrained  0.078 0.517 
LOGINC Logarithm of total family income 10.338 9.335 
PCTBLCK Percent African American households in residential zone 0.127 0.515 
PCTPVTY Percent households in poverty in residential zone 0.082 0.214 
AMNTY/PRC Zone fixed effect from the housing price hedonic  8.601 8.211 
EQTYRSK Measure of equity risk in zone 0.304 0.371 
CENCTY Variable is one if household resides in central city 0.287 0.737 
Sample Size  4009 956 
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Table 2. Location Attributes by Race and Owner-Occupancy 
  
Name1 
 
 
White 
Owner 
 
White 
Renter 
 
White 
Owner vs. 
Renter 
 
Black 
Owner 
 
Black 
Renter 
 
Black 
Owner vs. 
Renter 
 
Difference between  
White Own vs. Rent 
 & Black Own vs. Rent 
PCTBLCK 
 
0.115  
(0.003) 
0.145 
(0.005) 
-0.030 
(0.006) 
0.551  
(0.014) 
0.488 
(0.012) 
0.063  
(0.018) 
-0.093       
(0.019) 
PCTPVTY 
 
0.079  
(0.001) 
0.088  
(0.002) 
-0.009 
(0.002) 
0.210  
(0.006) 
0.217 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
AMNTY/PRC 
 
8.601  
(0.004) 
8.602  
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
8.178  
(0.018) 
8.237 
(0.019) 
-0.059 
(0.026) 
-0.060 
(0.027) 
EQTYRSK 
 
0.303  
(0.001) 
0.304  
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.383 
(0.003) 
0.361 
(0.003) 
0.022 
(0.005) 
-0.023 
(0.005) 
CENCTY 
 
0.261  
(0.009) 
0.328  
(0.012) 
-0.067 
(0.015) 
0.740 
(0.021) 
0.735 
(0.019) 
0.005 
(0.029) 
 -0.072 
(0.033) 
Sample Size 2483 1526  420 536   
1.  The standard errors of the sample mean and differences of means are listed in parentheses. 
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Table 3:  Residential Location Parameters 1 
 
Panel A:  White Owner-Occupants 
 
Variable Name 
 
Level 
 
Married 
 
High 
School 
 
College 
 
Prob. 
Employed 
 
Married  
Pr. Emp 
Head 
 
Married 
Pr. Emp 
Spouse 
 
Size of Option 
 
  0.164 
(7.144) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Option Variance  0.022 
(0.219) 
      
Percent Black  -1.974 
(3.782) 
-0.387  
(0.847) 
    1.025 
(1.797) 
  2.772 
(3.981) 
   
Percent Poverty -2.264 
(1.062) 
-1.487  
(0.682) 
-1.187  
(0.612) 
0.058 
(0.023) 
   
Amenity/Price   -2.687  
(4.842) 
-0.047  
(0.097) 
  2.167 
(4.065) 
   6.424 
 (10.206)  
   
Equity Risk   -10.706 
(5.131) 
1.168 
(0.638) 
  8.488 
(4.117) 
  1.649 
(6.637) 
   
Central City   0.581 
(3.871) 
 -0.429 
(2.978) 
-0.119  
(0.699) 
-0.264  
(1.137) 
   
 
Employment 
Access 
 
  3.983 
(3.728) 
 
    2.415 
(1.730) 
  
 
-4.048 
(3.272) 
 
3.834 
(1.333) 
 
 -1.295 
(4.068) 
 
 
Panel B:  Black Owner-Occupants 
 
Variable Name 
 
Level 
 
Married 
 
High 
School 
 
College 
 
Prob. 
Employed 
 
Married 
Pr. Emp 
Head 
 
Married 
Pr. Emp 
Spouse 
 
Size of Option 
 
  0.231 
(2.815) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Option Variance  0.379 
(1.148) 
      
Percent Black  3.111 
(5.532) 
0.014 
(0.021) 
  1.552 
(2.249) 
1.800 
(1.619) 
   
Percent Poverty -1.912  
(0.865) 
-2.880  
(1.560) 
1.819 
(0.646) 
-6.906  
(1.110) 
   
Amenity/Price     -1.770 
(1.938) 
-0.393  
(0.592) 
  2.531 
(2.184) 
1.624 
(0.690) 
   
Equity Risk -4.495  
(1.598) 
0.977 
(0.542) 
  9.964 
(3.077) 
12.413 
(2.261) 
   
Central City 0.505 
(1.440) 
-0.683  
(1.630) 
-0.537  
(1.212) 
-0.778  
(0.980) 
   
 
Employment 
Access 
 
  4.767 
(3.899) 
 
  3.834 
(2.083) 
 
     -3.370 
(1.661) 
 
-0.689  
(0.121) 
 
-10.233   
(1.361) 
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Table 3:  Residential Location Parameters (Continued) 
 
Panel C: White Renters 
 
Variable Name 
 
Level 
 
Married 
 
High 
School 
 
College 
 
Prob. 
Employed 
 
Married 
Pr. Emp 
Head 
 
Married 
Pr. Emp 
Spouse 
 
Size of Option 
 
  0.743 
(11.636)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Option Variance  -0.644  
(1.179) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Percent Black  -1.579 
(2.860) 
 -2.396 
(3.778) 
    1.052 
(1.685) 
  2.077 
(2.867) 
 
 
  
Percent Poverty  -8.182 
(4.036) 
1.321 
(0.588) 
0.945 
(0.512) 
  5.260 
(2.384) 
 
 
  
Amenity/Price  -3.394 
(5.737) 
0.012 
(0.022) 
  2.692 
(4.821) 
  5.878 
(8.541) 
 
 
  
Equity Risk   3.964 
(2.544) 
  5.385 
(3.313) 
 -4.380 
(2.501) 
 -6.685 
(3.328) 
 
 
  
Central City   0.372 
(2.280) 
-0.196  
(1.061) 
-0.232  
(1.186) 
0.377 
(1.625) 
 
 
  
Employment 
Access 
 3.346 
(3.491) 
-0.910  
(0.502) 
  -5.484 
(5.241) 
5.852 
(1.295) 
-9.876 
(1.808) 
 
 
Panel D:  Black Renters 
Variable Name Level Married High 
School 
College 
 
Prob. 
Employed 
 
Married 
Pr. Emp 
Head 
 
Married 
Pr. Emp 
Spouse 
Size of Option  0.338 
(3.774) 
      
Option Variance  1.410 
(1.314) 
      
Percent Black  2.569 
(5.137) 
-0.315  
(0.492) 
0.821 
(1.321) 
0.208 
(0.210) 
   
Percent Poverty 0.099 
(0.034) 
-0.828  
(0.180) 
    4.898 
(1.750) 
11.752 
(2.572) 
 
 
  
Amenity/Price -1.724  
(1.536) 
-1.148  
(0.747) 
  3.325 
(2.926) 
  8.820 
(4.790) 
 
 
  
Equity Risk  -4.648 
(3.400) 
-1.828  
(1.319) 
2.511 
(1.383) 
-0.176  
(0.063) 
 
 
  
Central City 0.396 
(1.453) 
0.105 
(0.278) 
   -0.626 
(1.771) 
-0.111  
(0.191) 
 
 
  
Employment 
Access 
 7.528 
(5.087) 
-2.878  
(0.763) 
  -13.913  
(6.985) 
  20.706 
(1.905) 
-30.718  
(2.306) 
 
1. T-Statistics are shown in parentheses.  The estimates in all panels were obtained from one pooled model. The 
pooled likelihood value is -16,142.
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Table 4:  Tenure Choice Models Using Baseline Specification 
 
Standard 
 
Location Attributes 
 
Nested Logit Model1 
 
Variable Names 
  White 
 
Race Int. 
 
White 
 
Race Int. 
 
White 
 
Race Int. 
 
Intercept 
 
-7.796  
(11.299)   
 
1.471 
(0.907) 
 
8.212 
(2.275) 
 
-12.110    
(1.082) 
 
-6.614  
(7.718) 
 
0.973 
(0.596)  
Credit 
Constrained 
 
-0.678  
(3.568) 
 
-0.687 
(2.345) 
 
-0.755  
(3.912) 
 
-0.674  
(2.232) 
 
-0.666  
(3.505) 
 
-0.611  
(2.071) 
 
Household 
Income 
 
0.306 
(6.354) 
 
0.220 
(1.760) 
 
0.345 
(6.886) 
 
0.182 
(1.379) 
 
0.305 
(6.341) 
 
0.124 
(0.969) 
 
Gender  of 
Householder 
 
0.292 
(2.631) 
 
-0.339  
(1.424) 
 
0.271 
(2.420) 
 
-0.256  
(1.053) 
 
0.281 
(2.509) 
 
-0.397  
(1.661) 
 
Marital Status 
 
 
-2.404  
(3.082) 
 
0.838 
(0.413) 
 
-2.586  
(3.290) 
 
0.517 
(0.248) 
 
-2.044  
(2.568) 
 
-0.311  
(0.147) 
 
High School 
Graduate 
 
-0.364  
(2.657) 
 
0.538 
(2.002) 
 
-0.244  
(1.755) 
 
0.257 
(0.921) 
 
-1.640  
(2.898) 
 
0.805 
(2.729) 
 
College Graduate 
 
 
-0.219  
(1.251) 
 
-0.070  
(0.166) 
 
-0.021 
(0.115) 
 
-0.282  
(0.648) 
 
-2.454  
(2.509) 
 
1.310 
(1.799) 
 
Married*High 
School 
 
1.180 
(4.996) 
 
-0.497  
(0.807) 
 
1.194 
(5.023) 
 
-0.312 
(0.494) 
 
1.211 
(5.110) 
 
-0.426  
(0.694) 
 
Married *College 
 
1.103 
(4.010) 
 
-0.699  
(0.904) 
 
1.148 
(4.144) 
 
-0.482  
(0.605) 
 
1.075 
(3.909) 
 
-0.711  
(0.926)  
Parents Present in 
Household 
 
0.775 
(1.765) 
 
0.454 
(0.575) 
 
0.820 
(1.876) 
 
0.623 
(0.791) 
 
0.780 
(1.773) 
 
0.514 
(0.642) 
 
Children Present 
in Household 
 
0.734 
(7.058) 
 
-0.175  
(0.795) 
 
0.725 
(6.905) 
 
-0.140  
(0.617) 
 
0.734 
(7.058) 
 
-0.102  
(0.457) 
 
Children Less 
than 6 Years Old 
 
0.442 
(3.007) 
 
-0.429  
(1.560) 
 
0.423 
(2.858) 
 
-0.440 
(1.571) 
 
0.426 
(2.898) 
 
-0.275  
(0.965) 
 
Age of 
Householder 
 
0.147 
(7.462) 
 
-0.122 
(2.837) 
 
0.141 
(7.085) 
 
-0.129  
(2.867) 
 
0.146 
(7.411) 
 
-0.133  
(3.043) 
 
Age Squared 
Divided by 100 
 
-0.104  
(5.876) 
 
0.107 
(2.629) 
 
-0.098  
(5.511) 
 
0.114 
(2.682) 
 
-0.102  
(5.763) 
 
0.130 
(3.088) 
 
Married*Age 
 
 
0.120 
(3.859) 
 
-0.075  
(0.889) 
 
0.126 
(4.026) 
 
-0.064  
(0.736) 
 
0.126 
(4.038) 
 
-0.052  
(0.606) 
 
Married *Age 
Squared 
 
-0.116 
(3.867) 
 
0.104 
(1.211) 
 
-0.120  
(3.974) 
 
0.091 
(1.022) 
 
-0.128  
(4.224) 
 
0.079 
(0.912) 
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Table 4:  Tenure Choice Models Using Baseline Specification (Continued) 
 
Standard 
 
Location Attributes 
 
Nested Logit Model 
 
Variable Names 
 
White 
 
Race Int. 
 
White 
 
Race Int. 
 
White 
 
Race Int. 
 
Percent Black in 
Zone 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.069  
(2.527) 
 
1.656 
(2.346) 
 
 
 
 
Percent Poverty 
in Zone 
 
 
 
 0.701 (0.499) 
-10.261    
(3.464) 
   
Amenity/Price 
Index in Zone 
 
 
 
 -1.782  (4.778) 
-1.257  
(1.060) 
   
Equity Risk in 
Zone 
 
 
 
 -3.123 (2.065) 
3.563 
(1.128) 
   
Central City 
Location 
 
 
 
 -0.083  (0.664) 
0.372 
(1.107) 
   
Inclusive Value 
 
 
 
 
   0.346 (2.322) 
 
 
 
Log likelihood 
 
-2,448.38 
 
-2,402.79 
 
-2,445.66 
1.  T-Statistics are based on standard errors have been generated through a Monte Carlo simulation approach. 
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Table 5:  Tenure Choice Models - Alternative Specifications 
 
Variable Names1 
 
Baseline 
 
Alt Constraint - 
5% disc rate 
 
Alt Constraint - 
SCF 
 
Instrument for 
Family Income 
 
Number of 
Relatives 
 
Grades 
Completed2 
 
Credit Constrained 
 
-0.666  
(3.523) 
 
-0.622  
(3.863) 
 
-0.597 
(4.146) 
 
-0.736  
(3.915) 
 
-0.632  
(3.326) 
 
-0.635 
(3.360) 
 
Family Income 
 
0.305 
(6.292) 
 
0.300 
(6.236) 
 
0.305 
(6.354) 
 
0.474 
(4.796) 
 
0.325 
(6.637) 
 
0.295 
(6.197) 
 
Race*Credit 
Constrained 
 
-0.611  
(2.078) 
 
-0.559  
(2.033) 
 
-0.691 
(2.383) 
 
-0.515  
(1.745) 
 
-0.582  
(1.973) 
 
-0.622 
(2.123) 
 
Race*Family Income 
 
0.124 
(0.969) 
 
0.110 
(0.863) 
 
0.107 
(0.829) 
 
0.427 
(1.688) 
 
0.129 
(1.004) 
 
0.110 
(0.866) 
 
Inclusive Value 
 
0.346 
(2.295) 
 
0.382 
(2.581) 
 
0.368 
(2.543) 
 
0.330 
(2.215) 
 
0.348 
(2.260) 
 
0.370 
(2.913) 
 
Number of Parameters 
 
33 
 
33 
 
33 
 
33 
 
33 
 
33 
 
Log likelihood 
 
-2,445.66 
 
-2,446.74 
 
-2,442.67 
 
-2,457.94 
 
-2,453.86 
 
-2,441.66 
1.  T-statistics are based on standard errors have been generated through a Monte Carlo simulation approach. 
2.  The specification of the first state multinomial logit was modified to also depend upon grades completed rather than educational attainment. 
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Table 6:  The Effect of Eliminating Racial Differences in Equilibrium Zone Attributes  
on Racial Differences in Homeownership 
 
Black Means adjusted to White Mean Values 
 
White Means adjusted to Black Mean Values 
 
Policy Simulation 
Variables   
White 
Sample 
 
Black 
Sample 
 
Racial 
Difference 
 
Change in 
Difference 
 
White 
Sample 
 
Black 
Sample 
 
Racial 
Difference 
 
Change in 
Difference 
 
All Attribtues1 
 
64.8 
 
37.0 
 
27.8 
 
 5.6 
 
67.0 
 
42.6 
 
24.4 
 
 2.0 
 
Percent Black 
 
64.8 
 
38.5 
 
26.3 
 
 4.1 
 
56.8 
 
42.6 
 
14.2 
 
-8.2 
 
Percent in Poverty 
 
64.8 
 
66.4 
 
-1.6 
 
-22.8   
 
66.4 
 
42.6 
 
21.8 
 
-0.6 
 
Amenity/Price  
 
64.8 
 
22.8 
 
42.0 
 
19.8  
 
76.6 
 
42.6 
 
32.0 
 
 9.6 
 
Central City 
 
64.8 
 
40.2 
 
24.6 
 
 2.4 
 
64.1 
 
42.6 
 
21.5 
 
-0.9 
 
Equity Risk 
 
64.8 
 
42.0 
 
22.8 
 
 0.6 
 
60.8 
 
42.6 
 
18.2 
 
-4.2 
1.  Tract attributes are adjusted so that the mean tract attributes are the same for both whites and blacks.  As a result, these predictions are based on the 
model that treats location as exogenous and includes location characteristics in the specification.  Note that the unadjusted predictions are found in the 
column labeled white sample for black means adjusted and black sample for white means adjusted, the first and sixth columns, respectively.  The 
predicted racial difference before adjustments is 22.2 percentage points. 
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Table 7:  The Effect of Eliminating Differences in the Role of Location on Racial Differences in Homeownership 
 
Black Means adjusted to White Mean Values 
 
White Means adjusted to Black Mean Values 
 
Policy Simulation 
Variables   
White 
Sample 
 
Black 
Sample 
 
Racial 
Difference 
 
Change in 
Difference 
 
White 
Sample 
 
Black 
Sample 
 
Racial 
Difference 
 
Change in 
Difference 
 
Inclusive Value 
 
64.8 
 
24.4 
 
40.0 
 
17.6  
 
81.3 
 
42.4 
 
38.9 
 
16.5  
 
Cond. Incl. Val.1 
 
64.8 
 
19.9 
 
44.9 
 
23.5  
 
80.7 
 
42.4 
 
38.3 
 
15.9  
 
Education Level2 
 
64.8 
 
44.1 
 
20.7 
 
-1.7 
 
59.0 
 
42.4 
 
16.6 
 
-5.8 
 
Marital Status 
 
64.8 
 
41.8 
 
23.0 
 
 0.6 
 
66.3 
 
42.4 
 
23.9 
 
 1.5 
1. The entries in the row entitled conditional inclusive values are adjusted so that the inclusive value means are the same by race across educational and 
marital status categories so that the influence of location is the same by race after controlling for education and marital status. 
2. The entries in the rows entitled education level and marital status are based on adjusting the educational attainment or marital status variables, 
respectively, so that the means are the same by race. 
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Table 8:  The Effect of Altering Tract Attributes on Racial Differences in Homeownership 
 
A 10 % Increase in Attribute 
 
A 10% Reduction in Standard Error 
 
Policy Simulation 
Variables   
White 
Sample 
 
Black 
Sample 
 
Racial 
Difference 
 
Change in 
Difference 
 
White 
Sample 
 
Black 
Sample 
 
Racial 
Difference 
 
Change in 
Difference 
 
Percent Black 
 
64.8 
 
43.0 
 
21.8 
 
-0.6 
 
70.7 
 
34.2 
 
36.5 
 
14.1 
 
Percent Poverty 
 
65.0 
 
41.6 
 
23.4 
 
 1.0 
 
70.6 
 
32.5 
 
38.1 
 
15.7 
 
Percent Poverty1 
 
64.9 
 
41.9 
 
23.0 
 
 0.6 
 
69.4 
 
33.6 
 
35.8 
 
13.4 
 
Amenity/Price 
 
64.7 
 
42.9 
 
21.8 
 
-0.8 
 
69.3 
 
33.4 
 
35.9 
 
13.5 
 
Equity Risk 
 
63.8 
 
43.9 
 
19.9 
 
-2.5 
 
64.3 
 
36.9 
 
27.4 
 
 5.0 
 
Equity Risk1 
 
64.0 
 
44.0 
 
20.0 
 
-2.4 
 
64.1 
 
39.8 
 
27.3 
 
 4.9 
1. The price level is included as a proxy for unobserved location attributes.  Separate regressions indicate an empirical relationship between the price level 
and both percent poverty and equity risk.  For example, an increase in percent poverty decreases the price level, and an increase in percent poverty 
holding price level fixed implies an increase in the quality of unobserved location attributes. The third and sixth rows in the table show the effect of a 
change in percent poverty or equity risk, respectively, in which the price level is also adjusted to hold unobserved location attributes constant. 
  44
 
Table A1: Household Level First Stage Estimations1 
 
 
Variable Names 
 
Tenure 
 
20% 
Down 
Payment 
 
Optimal 
Quantity 
 
Non-labor 
Income 
 
Housing 
Equity 
 
Race of 
Householder 
 
0.076 
(0.086) 
 
-0.213 
(0.148) 
 
-0.371 
(0.073) 
 
-0.040 
(0.029) 
 
-0.163 
(0.023) 
Gender  of 
Householder 
0.036 
(0.058) 
-0.192 
(0.107) 
0.042 
(0.050) 
0.034 
(0.020) 
-0.034 
(0.016) 
Marital Status 
 
-0.099 
(0.186) 
-0.275 
(0.293) 
0.051 
(0.159) 
-0.069 
(0.062) 
-0.185 
(0.054) 
High School 
Graduate 
0.102 
(0.060) 
0.067 
(0.096) 
0.053 
(0.041) 
0.033 
(0.018) 
0.023 
(0.013) 
College Graduate 
 
0.277 
(0.080) 
0.113 
(0.121) 
0.361 
(0.054) 
0.092 
(0.025) 
0.107 
(0.018) 
Spouse is High 
School Graduate 
0.249 
(0.091) 
0.055 
(0.123) 
0.115 
(0.054) 
0.015 
(0.027) 
0.039 
(0.018) 
Spouse is College 
Graduate 
0.553 
(0.123) 
0.167 
(0.156) 
0.222 
(0.072) 
0.059 
(0.036) 
0.078 
(0.025) 
Age of 
Householder 
0.059 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.002) 
Age Squared 
Divided by 100 
-0.043 
(0.007) 
0.031 
(0.020) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
Spouse's Age 
 
0.042 
(0.010) 
0.015 
(0.016) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.011 
(0.003) 
Spouse's Age 
Squared 
-0.053 
(0.013) 
-0.016 
(0.024) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.011 
(0.003) 
Parents Present in 
Household 
0.778 
(0.209) 
0.116 
(0.268) 
0.256 
(0.123) 
-0.047 
(0.057) 
0.071 
(0.043) 
Siblings Present in 
Household 
0.437 
(0.138) 
0.224 
(0.261) 
0.000 
(0.114) 
0.062 
(0.041) 
0.033 
(0.037) 
Children Present 
in Household 
0.214 
(0.058) 
0.005 
(0.093) 
0.040 
(0.054) 
0.018 
(0.020) 
0.029 
(0.018) 
Other Family 
Members 
0.108 
(0.072) 
-0.043 
(0.110) 
-0.009 
(0.059) 
-0.012 
(0.022) 
0.018 
(0.020) 
Number of Adults 
in Household 
0.103 
(0.056) 
-0.028 
(0.096) 
0.042 
(0.055) 
-0.016 
(0.019) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
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Table A1: Household Level First Stage Estimations (Continued)
 
Variable Names 
 
Tenure 
 
20% 
Down 
Payment 
 
Optimal 
Quantity 
 
Non-labor 
Income 
 
Housing 
Equity 
Number of Retired -0.048 
(0.074) 
-0.076 
(0.119) 
-0.038 
(0.038) 
0.080 
(0.019) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
Number of 
Children 
-0.042 
(0.059) 
-0.073 
(0.094) 
-0.034 
(0.055) 
0.015 
(0.020) 
-0.027 
(0.019) 
Num. of Children 
Less than Six 
0.101 
(0.050) 
0.127 
(0.060) 
-0.036 
(0.038) 
0.015 
(0.020) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
Less than One 
Vehicle / Adult 
0.306 
(0.074) 
-0.090 
(0.139) 
0.146 
(0.055) 
-0.007 
(0.023) 
0.030 
(0.017) 
One or More 
Vehicle / Adult 
0.694 
(0.070) 
0.072 
(0.139) 
0.282 
(0.057) 
0.011 
(0.022) 
0.091 
(0.017) 
Income from 
Business 
0.159 
(0.085) 
0.089 
(0.101) 
 0.579 
(0.021) 
0.054 
(0.016) 
from Social 
Security 
0.066 
(0.075) 
0.211 
(0.111) 
 0.306 
(0.022) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
from Interest 
 
0.212 
(0.056) 
0.318 
(0.078) 
 0.188 
(0.016) 
0.081 
(0.011) 
from Rent 
 
0.664 
(0.102) 
-0.102 
(0.115) 
 0.133 
(0.022) 
0.033 
(0.017) 
from Alimony 
 
0.068 
(0.105) 
-0.314 
(0.149) 
 0.110 
(0.030) 
0.012 
(0.033) 
from Welfare 
 
-0.872 
(0.093) 
0.030 
(0.198) 
 0.159 
(0.027) 
0.003 
(0.029) 
from Other 
 
-0.108 
(0.073) 
-0.129 
(0.100) 
 0.106 
(0.022) 
-0.021 
(0.018) 
Years in Residence   -0.010 
(0.004) 
  
Square of Years 
divided by 100 
  0.019 
(0.008) 
  
Inverse Mills Ratio 
(Tenure) 
  0.029 
(0.024) 
 0.004 
(0.008) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
(Const) 
  -0.369 
(0.161) 
  
Sample Size 5,190 2,915 2,072 3,315 1,775 
Log likelihood -2449.32 -1184.40 0.465 0.374 0.343 
 
 
1.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses for all tables in the appendix.
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Table A2: Individual Level First Stage Estimation 
 
Variable Names 
 
Employment 
 
Log of Labor Earnings 
 
Householder Male 
 
0.207  
(0.048) 
 
0.107  
(0.088)  
Marital Status 
 
-0.011  
(0.051) 
 
-0.061  
(0.102)  
High School Graduate 
 
0.292  
(0.041) 
 
-0.046  
(0.156)  
College Graduate 
 
  0.363  
(0.053)  
 
0.112  
(0.134)  
Intercept Age < 18 
 
-6.961  
(0.976) 
 
9.595  
(4.253)  
Slope Age <18 
 
0.295  
(0.057) 
 
0.005  
(0.230)  
Intercept 18 <= Age <23 
 
-3.780  
(0.697) 
 
8.366  
(2.165)  
Slope 18 <= Age < 23 
 
0.123  
(0.029) 
 
0.090  
(0.077)  
Intercept 23 <= Age < 55 
 
-0.711  
(0.384) 
 
10.090  
(1.169)  
Slope 23 <= Age < 55 
 
0.008  
(0.002) 
 
0.014  
(0.005)  
Intercept 55 <= Age < 65 
 
0.241  
(0.787) 
 
10.340  
(2.735)  
Slope 55 <= Age < 65 
 
-0.045  
(0.010) 
 
0.014  
(0.039)  
Intercept 65 <= Age  
 
3.467  
(0.083) 
 
10.258  
(2.218)  
Slope 65 <= Age  
 
-0.083  
(0.014) 
 
0.010  
(0.036)  
Reference Person 
 
0.988  
(0.362) 
 
-0.072  
(0.906)  
Spouse of Reference Person 
 
0.162  
(0.359) 
 
0.292  
(0.878)  
Child of Reference Person 
 
0.439  
(0.364) 
 
-0.164  
(0.893)  
Parent of Reference Person 
 
0.207  
(0.477) 
 
1.849  
(1.385)  
Sibling of Reference Person 
 
0.751  
(0.387) 
 
-0.385  
(0.942)  
Other 
 
0.530  
(0.375) 
 
-0.086  
(0.922) 
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Table A2: Individual Level First Stage Estimations (Continued)
Variable Names Employment Labor Earnings 
 
Number Adults in Household 
 
0.022  
(0.017) 
 
-0.034  
(0.038)  
# Retired 
 
0.207  
(0.049) 
 
-0.166  
(0.124)  
# of Children 
 
-0.048  
(0.016) 
 
-0.040  
(0.035)  
# Kids less than Six 
 
-0.182  
(0.031) 
 
0.083  
(0.073)  
Less than One Vehicle / Adult 
 
0.292  
(0.056) 
 
0.043  
(0.147)  
One or More Vehicle / Adult 
 
0.456  
(0.057) 
 
0.145  
(0.162)  
Receives Income from Business 
 
0.229  
(0.049) 
 
-2.933  
(0.100)  
from Social Security 
 
-0.452  
(0.047) 
 
0.414  
(0.153)  
from Interest 
 
-0.098  
(0.038) 
 
0.221  
(0.076)  
from Rent 
 
-0.048  
(0.058) 
 
0.213  
(0.116)  
from Alimony 
 
0.044  
(0.073) 
 
0.064  
(0.151)  
from Welfare 
 
-0.885  
(0.067) 
 
0.518  
(0.307)  
from Other 
 
-0.217  
(0.048) 
 
-0.007  
(0.106)  
Inverse Mills Ratio (Employed) 
 
 
 
-1.820  
(0.391) 
Sample Size 10,842 5,465 
R2  0.245 
Log likelihood -5,101.46  
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Table A3: Estimations for Housing Price Indices 
 
Variable Names 
 
Log of Housing Price 
 
Log of Monthly Rent 
 
Square Feet 
 
 
0.182  
(0.031) 
 
0.021  
(0.020) 
Number of Bedrooms 
 
0.062  
(0.014) 
0.035  
(0.014) 
 
Number of Bathrooms 0.118  
(0.023) 
0.112  
(0.039) 
 
Number of Half Baths 0.089  (0.022) 
0.162  
(0.038) 
 
Number of Dining Rooms 0.054  (0.026) 
0.083  
(0.026) 
 
Number of Living Rooms 0.141  (0.094) 
 
 
Number of Kitchens 0.079  (0.102) 
 
 
Number of Other Rooms 0.132  (0.025) 
0.054  
(0.032) 
 
Age of Structure 0.005  (0.003) 
 
 
Age of Structure Squared / 100 -0.007  (0.003) 
 
 
Owner is First Occupant 0.311  (0.062) 
 
 
Unit has Cellar 0.048  (0.033) 
-0.017  
(0.052) 
 
Unit has Garage 0.121  (0.025) 
0.126  
(0.041) 
 
Unit has Porch -0.017  (0.027) 
0.015  
(0.022) 
 
Unit has Central Air 0.121  (0.029) 
0.229  
(0.031) 
 
Unit has Public Sewer -0.042  (0.036) 
-0.074  
(0.051) 
 
Unit has Fire Place 0.171  (0.027) 
0.173  
(0.045) 
 
Single Family Attached -0.158  (0.034) 
0.044  
(0.052) 
 
Multi-family 0.217  (0.059) 
0.185  
(0.061) 
 
Part of Utilities in Rent  0.088  (0.031) 
 
Inverse Mills Ratio (Tenure) 0.032  (0.018) 
0.024  
(0.015) 
Sample Size 3,009 2,112 
R2  0.346 
Log likelihood 0.506  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1.  Painter, Gabriel,  and Meyers also examine tenure choice for Asians and Latinos.  Also see Coulson 
(1999). 
 
2.  The importance of credit constraints was first suggested and demonstrated in a theoretical model by 
Zorn (1989).  Hendershott, LaFayette, and Haurin (1997) recognize that households also may be credit 
constrained due to limited income and examine the influence of both income and down payment 
constraints on homeownership. 
3. There also exists a large literature that examines residential location choice in order to assess the 
importance of commuting time and costs.  For some examples see Anas and Chu (1984), Anas (1981), 
Lerman (1977), and Quigley (1976). 
4.  Gabriel and Rosenthal (1989) and Waddell (1992) both estimate multinomial logit models.  See 
Boehm and Ihlanfeldt (1991) for a multivariate probit model of residential location choice. 
5.  For example, an analysis of the mortgage application data in Boston (Munnell et. al., 1996) indicates 
that African-American applicants have substantially higher loan to value ratios and somewhat higher 
housing expense to income ratios. 
 
6.  Waddell estimates a multinomial logit that includes both residential location and tenure choice, but 
Waddell only examines the relationship between household demographic characteristics and 
homeownership not the relationship between location and homeownership.  
7.  The Nested Logit Model, also known as Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) model, is attributed to 
McFadden (1978). Train (1986) pointed out that McFadden's GEV model has sometimes been mislabeled 
as sequential logit, which may mislead the researcher to think that the decision maker makes a sequence 
of choices, each of which is described by logit. However, the GEV model derived by McFadden assumes 
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that the decision maker makes one choice, namely, one alternative out of the set of all possible outcome 
combinations. 
8.  Some existing studies (see Quigley (1985), for example) model the housing choice using a hierarchy 
where community choice is the highest level, neighborhood the next highest, and the character of the 
housing unit itself including rental or owner-occupied as the lowest level choice.  We compare the 
specification used here to an alternative nesting structure in which residential location is the highest level 
and tenure choice is the lower level following Borsh-Supan (1987, p. 74).  He suggests choosing the 
structure that yields the lowest value for the Akaike information Criteria (Amemiya, 1980), which is 2*(-
L + k)/N where L is the log-likelihood value for a model, k is the number of parameters including any 
inclusive values, and N is the sample size.  The nesting structure with tenure choice at the top is preferred 
to the alternative.  The detailed results of the test are provided in endnote 16. 
9.  The estimated location fixed effects are essentially hedonic price indices.  The concept behind a price 
index is to measure the price level of housing services associated with a specific location.  Hedonic price 
indices accomplish this by using a regression to control for the contribution of physical characteristics to 
the sales or rental price of a housing unit.  Implicit in this approach is that the spatial variation in the price 
indices results from the locational amenities offered by each location.  See Goodman (1978). 
 
10.  See Tootell (1996) and Ross and Tootell (1999) for other examples where the rent to house price 
ratios are used to capture equity risk.  These papers use the ratio of tract median rent to tract median 
house price.  Such a proxy will suffer from measurement error if the quality and quantity of the housing 
stock varies between rental and owner-occupied housing.  Our equity risk proxy avoids this problem by 
using a hedonic price estimation to obtain a quality adjusted price of rental and owner-occupied housing.  
Our proxy, however, may also suffer from measurement error if the spatial distribution of rental and 
owner-occupied housing varies within each zone and the location quality of owner-occupied housing 
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relative to rental housing varies across the zones. 
11.  O'Regan and Quigley (1998) also use a gravity model to create a measure of job access.  They 
demonstrate that the gravity model provides results that are very similar to more sophisticated models that 
explicitly recognize that flows are count variables using a binomial or Poisson distribution.  
12.  The commuting time survey has not been administered as part of the metropolitan sample of the AHS 
since 1985, and therefore no information on work location, commuting, or mode choice is available for 
the AHS after that year.   
13.  If the reference person is married, the family educational attainment is the average of the reference 
individual and their spouse's educational attainment.  These attainment variables are interacted with 
marital status.  This specification outperforms a specification in which the reference person and their 
spouse's attainment enter separately. 
14.  Philadelphia is one of the few metropolitan areas sample for the American Housing Survey in which 
the traffic analysis zones of the 1990 Census Transportation Planning Package are coincident with either 
census tracts or census block groups. 
15.  There exists an ongoing debate as to whether housing discrimination is a substantial cause of 
residential segregation.  This debate often hinges on whether African-American households pay more for 
comparable housing than white households, see Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999). It is important to 
point out that our finding that African-Americans tend to reside in locations with low price levels sheds 
absolutely no light on this debate.  Our housing price estimations only control for the physical 
characteristics of housing.  Therefore, the white and African-American housing in this sample are not 
comparable because the quality of the neighborhoods may vary dramatically and these quality differences 
are almost certainly the cause of the price differentials, see Chambers (1992). 
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16.  These means are based on the average location attributes within a zone and are only intended to 
describe the distribution of the sample across the zones.  If African-Americans are segregated within each 
zone, as well as across the zones, these means may understate racial differences in neighborhood quality.   
 
17.  In order to test the nesting structure, we estimate an alternative model in which residential location 
outcome represents the higher level choice and tenure choice is estimated conditional on location.  The 
tenure choice model for this alternative specification conditions upon location by interacting household 
characteristics with the five locations attributes:  percent African American, percent poverty, central city, 
price level, and equity risk.  The model in the paper had a loglikelihood value of –18,588 and included 
141 parameters.  The alternative model had a loglikelihood value of –18,537 and included 280 
parameters.  The Akaike Information Criteria loss function yields 7.546 for the model in the paper and 
7.581 for the alternative model.  The model in the paper is preferred. 
 
18.   The standard errors are estimated using a Monte Carlo simulation approach because the inclusion of 
the predicted value for being credit constrained and the predicted inclusive value (for model III) may bias 
the standard errors.  Specifically, 5000 samples are drawn from the analysis sample with replacement.  
The tenure choice model is re-estimated using these samples in order to characterize the distribution of 
the parameters.  
 
19.   Simulated standard errors for the inclusive value are based on the estimated Hessian from the 
residential location model.  Specifically, a sample of 5000 parameter vectors are drawn from the 
estimated distribution of the parameters, and the sample of vectors are used to create a simulated sample 
of inclusive values. 
 
20.  These differences are quite robust to alternative specifications of the residential location model.  We 
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estimated many alternative models including models that omit equity risk and/or the amenity/price index, 
add percent households that are owner-occupants, and finally replace job access with the average 
commuting time between the head of household’s place of work and each possible residential location.  
The basic results were robust to these alternative specifications. 
 
21.  It should be noted that educational attainment enters both the homeownership and the residential 
location models directly.  Therefore, the first stage model is also re-estimated using years of education in 
order to create a new inclusive value. 
22.  In this model, the interaction of race and the constraint variable is only significant at the 10 percent 
level.  This modification has little effect on either the white coefficients on the constraint and family 
income variables, or the coefficient on the inclusive value.  However, the interaction between race and 
family income becomes significant at the 10 percent level, and the racial interactions for the income and 
constraint variables are jointly significant at the 5 percent level.  If family income is not assumed to be 
exogenous, there is still evidence that the influence of financial resources on homeownership varies by 
race, but we cannot disentangle the effect of income from the effect of being credit constrained. 
23.  Of course, this result does not imply that African-Americans benefit from being in neighborhoods 
with a low price level and poor amenities.  It is quite possible that discrimination forces some African-
American households into poor quality locations and that these households would be better off renting in 
a higher quality location. 
 
24.  This approach is similar to the approach used by Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman (1996).  Using 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data, they estimate census tract fixed effects on the propensity of loan 
approval while controlling for individual level variables.  In a second stage, they estimate a tract level 
model using the fixed effects as dependent variables and controlling for tract characteristics. 
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25.  Also see Artle and Varaiya (1978), Brueckner (1986), and Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter (1997). 
26.  The household assets included in the dependent variable were checking, saving, and money market 
accounts, stocks, bonds, and cash. 
27.  See Follain and Jimenez (1985) for a survey.  For recent work on racial differences in housing prices, 
see Kiel and Zabel (1996) and Chambers (1992).  
28.  Similar results arise using total number of commuters between the zones and the average commute 
times over all modes for the gravity model. 
